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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the higher prevalence of South multinational enterprises
(MNEs) in risky developing countries may be explained by the experience that they have
acquired of poor institutional quality at home. We confirm the intuition provided by our an-
alytical model by empirically showing that the positive impact of good public governance
on foreign direct investment (FDI) in a given host country is moderated significantly, and
even in some cases eliminated, when MNEs have been faced with poor institutional quality
at home.
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1 Introduction
This observation also suggests that businessmen from one country with poor formal governance
will have an advantage in investing or trading with another, as compared to those who come from
countries with good formal governance. [...] This may explain some of the recent success of
multinationals from these countries when it comes to making foreign direct investments—their
specific asset is the entrepreneurial and managerial skill in navigating economic systems with poor
governance [Dixit (2009), p.20].
The traditional stream of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the industrialised world (the
“North”) is gradually being supplemented by outward FDI undertaken by multinationals based
in developing countries (the “South”). Although certainly not a new phenomenon, this “South-
South” FDI has grown rapidly in recent years. Aykut and Ratha (2004) and UNCTAD (2006)
estimate that one third to one half of total FDI inflows reported by developing countries came
from other developing countries in the last decade. The fact that this share is frequently much
higher in low-income countries and those with relatively risky investment environments (UNC-
TAD, 2006) suggests that South multinational enterprises (MNEs) may be less deterred by poor
public governance conditions than those from the North. This hypothesis may appear surprising
given the importance that the FDI literature attaches to good public governance.1 Nevertheless,
a few empirical studies point in this direction. Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) finds that investors from
countries with high levels of corruption are undeterred by foreign corruption. Indeed, they
may even preferentially locate their activities in countries where corruption is widespread. This
result is echoed by those of Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) who suggest that South MNEs
are likely to be more prevalent among the largest foreign firms in those developing countries
characterised by poor institutions. The argument underlying both studies is that South MNEs,
having acquired the ability to operate in poor institutional environments at home, have a com-
petitive edge over their North counterparts in risky developing countries.2 This relationship,
between experience of poor institutional quality and sensitivity to a host country’s public gov-
ernance, has yet to be rigorously modeled and tested.
1Wei (2000), Daude and Stein (2007) and Azémar and Desbordes (2009) find a strong statistical and substantial
positive impact of good public governance on FDI.
2See also http://www.princeton.edu/~dixitak/home/GrahamLec4.pdf, in which Dixit pro-
vides similar intuition regarding the superior ability of South MNEs to cope with bad governance and urges more
empirical work on the issue.
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The purpose of this paper is to make a first step towards filling this gap. We start by setting
out a simple analytical model of FDI location in which the location choice of an MNE is influ-
enced by its experience of poor institutional quality at home. A firm that has faced institutional
difficulties in its home country may have developed the skills which render similar problems
overseas less problematic for it, relative to a firm that has never operated in such a setting. Our
simulations illustrate how a South MNE is less deterred by country risk abroad than a North
MNE and may even choose a different location in order to potentially earn a higher return in
the more risky country. We then turn to our empirical analysis to investigate whether these
outcomes emerge in the real economy. We systematically show that the positive association
between the quality of a host country’s public governance and FDI is strongest when MNEs
have little experience of poor institutional quality at home. A decomposition of the effects
of better public governance at the extensive and extensive margins suggests that experience
of institutional risk particularly matters when there has been no previous FDI between two
countries. However, once this ‘hurdle’ has been crossed, the disadvantage that a MNE may
encounter from having little experience of poor institutional quality at home may be partly off-
set by ‘demonstration’ effects, arising from an initial investment by that same MNE or by any
compatriot MNEs. Overall, it appears that South MNEs are much more likely to invest in risky
countries than North MNEs.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 details our theoretical model,
which makes explicit how experience of institutional risk can impact on the expected prof-
itability of FDI. In section 3 we describe the data used in our empirical analysis and motivate
our econometric approach. Section 4 presents and interprets our detailed results and section 5
concludes.
2 A simple analytical model
We develop a simple model of foreign direct investment (FDI). Consider an MNE with head-
quarters in source country s. The firm can choose amongst a number of countries as potential
hosts for FDI. A production facility in host country h will generate a flow of after-tax profits
in each period equal to Πsh. Its decision as to where to locate its production will be strongly
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influenced by the profit flows that would arise from FDI in each of the candidate host countries.
We therefore define the gap between profits from locating in country 1 as compared to investing
in country 2 as its “location advantage”:
Γs12 ≡ Πs1 − Πs2. (1)
A broad range of factors may account for one country having a location advantage over another
nation as the host for a firm’s FDI. Differences in the economic environments of host nations
may arise with respect to: the sizes of their domestic markets; their levels of development or
geographic distance. We do not model the reason behind these differences but merely accept
that firms will find some investment locations more attractive than others.
The investment made by the MNE is expected to be productive and last into the future.
Consequently, the firm will look at the present value of the expected stream of current and
future profits. Assume, for now, that there is no risk involved in the FDI and that the plant
is expected to maintain production (and profitability) indefinitely. The present values of the
expressions in (1) are
PV (Πsh) =
Πsh
1− δ
, h = 1, 2 (2)
PV (Γs12) =
Πs1 − Πs2
1− δ
, (3)
where δ is the discount factor of the firm.3 When investments have the same expected longevity,
accounting for the future leaves the firm’s optimal choice of location for its FDI unchanged. We
now consider the implications of international differences in the expected lifetimes of foreign
production facilities.
2.1 Institutional risk
The life of the MNE’s overseas plant may be cut short for many reasons. We focus on problems
with respect to the institutions in the host country. We suppose that there is a risk rh in every
period that the production facility in host country h will cease to return a profit to its owners in
source country s. This may arise because of some catastrophic breakdown in the host country’s
3We ignore international differences in discount rates.
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economy such that the firm is unable to continue producing. Alternatively, production may
carry on but ownership of the firm is expropriated by the host country’s government. This risk,
if it differs between source countries, will figure in the MNE’s calculations as to its preferred
production location.
We are particularly interested in determining whether there is an experience effect. That is,
we ask whether an MNE’s previous experience with poor institutions at home has an influence
on its perceptions of the risk inherent in investing in other nations. It may be the case that a
firm having faced institutional difficulties at home will have developed skills that render similar
problems overseas less problematic, relative to investors from other nations who have never
been exposed to such risks. We define εsh as the subjective probability for firms from source
country s that FDI in country h will shut down in the current period. This can be modelled as
εsh ≡ (1− e
α
s ) rh, (4)
where es is the MNE’s experience of domestic institutional risk, es < 1 and α > 0. For a
risk-free host (rh = 0), the firm’s experience of dealing with poor institutions is irrelevant.
Should the potential host have an uncertain investment climate (rh > 0), an investing firm with
relatively more experience of institutional risk will have greater confidence in FDI in country h
than a firm based in a country with a less-checkered past. Thus experience of poor institutions
at home mitigates the institutional risk in the host country.4
We can rewrite (2), using (4) to incorporate risk, such that the expected present value of the
profit stream to a firm from country s arising from FDI in country h is
EPV (Πsh) =
Πsh
1− δ + δεsh
. (5)
The partial derivatives of (5) are
dEPV (Πsh)
drh
=
−δ (1− eαs ) Πsh
[1− δ + δεsh]
2 < 0,
dEPV (Πsh)
des
=
δαeα−1s rhΠsh
[1− δ + δεsh]
2 > 0.
4In (4), the experience effect is strongest for low values of α (close to zero) and it declines as α increases.
4
Thus poorer institutions in the potential host country lower the expected stream of profits, mak-
ing FDI in that location less attractive. The greater the MNE’s experience of poor institutions
at home, the better it perceives it will be able to cope with risk to its FDI.
Now consider the firm’s investment choice between the two potential host countries, 1 and
2. The firm will consider the expected present values of the two locations and will choose
country 1 over country 2 if
EPV (Γs12) =
Πs1
1− δ + δεs1
−
Πs2
1− δ + δεs2
> 0. (6)
Rewriting expression (6), separating the risk elements, yields
EPV (Γs12) = PV (Γs12) +
δ [(1− δ + δεs1) εs2Πs2 − (1− δ + δεs2) εs1Πs1]
(1− δ) (1− δ + δεs1) (1− δ + δεs2)
. (7)
This decomposition indicates that any location advantage that country 1 might enjoy is dimin-
ished if country 2 is perceived to be a relatively safer investment environment.
We have already established that source-country experience of poor institutional quality can
be beneficial for FDI in hosts with poor institutions, but such experience is of no use for FDI in
risk-free host countries. Thus there is the potential for firms, that are in all other respects identi-
cal save for their institutional experience, to perceive potential FDI returns differently when the
hosts differ in their institutional quality. Suppose then that there are two firms from different
source countries, A and B. The two potential hosts differ in that country 2 is completely safe
but FDI in country 1 carries some risk, that is r1 > r2 = 0. We further assume that country B
has had a more turbulent past than has rock-solid country A, that is eB > eA = 0. This allows
us to rank the perceived levels of risks associated with source and host pairs of nations:
r1 = εA1 > εB1 > εA2 = εB2 = r2 = 0.
This characterisation of the four countries might be consistent with source country A being
from the “North” while source country B is from the “South”. With regard to the potential
destinations for FDI, host country 2 could be considered more “Northern” than host country 1
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due to its more robust institutional framework.5
We can then re-write (7) as
EPV (ΓA12) = PV (ΓA12)−
δr1ΠA1
(1− δ) (1− δ + δr1)
,
EPV (ΓB12) = PV (ΓB12)−
δεB1ΠB1
(1− δ) (1− δ + δεB1)
.
(8)
Suppose that, in the absence of uncertainty, the two firms would be equally profitable in the
same host nation, that is, Πh = ΠAh = ΠBh for h = {1, 2}. Assume also that country 1
has a location advantage, such that PV (ΓA12) = PV (ΓB12) > 0. The second terms of the
expressions in 8 are positive and thus the risk associated with FDI in country 1 will offset
its location advantage. Indeed, if FDI in country 1 is particularly risky, the relative stability of
country 2’s institutions might be sufficiently large that it attracts FDI from both firms. However,
country B’s firm has been exposed to poor institutions, making it better able to deal with any
problems in country 1. Thus it may choose to invest in that location, if the location advantage
is large enough to offset the increased risk of closure, while country A’s firm opts for the more
secure environment of country 2.
Maintaining our assumptions regarding the institutional experiences of the four countries
in question, we illustrate the circumstances under which both firms would choose FDI in the
lower profit, risk-free host over investing in the riskier, but potentially more profitable, nation.6
Consider first how varying the experience with risk on the part of the firm changes the relative
attractiveness of the two locations.
[Figure 1 about here.]
This is illustrated in Figure 1 which traces EPV (Γs12) as the experience of the source
country changes. When EPV (Γs12) > 0, the higher return in host country 1 more than offsets
the greater risk associated with investing in that country. The less experience a firm has of
dealing with investment risk, the less able it is to deal with the poor institutional framework in
the higher return country and it would choose low-risk country B instead.
5This labelling convention that we have adopted, while rather crude, captures an important stylised fact that the
more-established industrialised economies of the “North” tend to have better institutions and have had this high
institutional quality for some time as compared to newly industrialising nations of the “South”.
6We use the following parameter values: Πs1 = 1.0, Πs2 = 0.8, δ = 0.9, r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0, eA = 0, eB = 0.8
and α = 1.
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Effectively, a MNE with greater experience of institutional problems is more willing to
invest in a risky climate relative to placing its FDI in a safer host that has a lower return. In
Figure 2, we illustrate the cases under which each MNE may choose a different host for its
investment and when they co-locate.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The lower line represents EPV (ΓB12) while the upper line shows EPV (ΓA12). When
country 1 is as safe as its rival location for FDI, both firms will choose to invest there to take
advantage of the higher profitability. The benefits for both firms from investing in country 1
begin to be eroded as that country’s riskiness increases, but the impact will be more severe
for the firm from country A, which has no experience of dealing with poor institutions. Thus
higher risk in country 1 will eventually make country 2 the preferred location for the FDI of
both firms. There will, however, be a range of levels of risk in country 1 at which the more-
experienced firm from source country B will choose to invest there, while country A’s firm,
with little experience of poor institutions, will abandon country 1 for the security of investing
in the less risky location of country 2.
The experience effect considers a MNE’s reaction to risk regardless of the host country.
Our key hypothesis is that the greater exposure of MNEs to institutional risk in their source
country the smaller the weight attributed to a host country’s institutional risk in their location
decisions. However there may be other factors that influence the decision as to whether the
firm may invest in a particular country. Suppose, for instance, that there are two potential hosts,
identical in every observable respect (including risk), except that one of the countries is already
host to FDI from the same source country as that of the firm. The MNE might then be able to
elicit information from its compatriot about local investment conditions, lowering the perceived
risk to FDI in that country. Even in the absence of such knowledge transfer, the observation
that an enterprise from its own country has set up in a particular host might be sufficient for an
MNE to infer that market conditions in that particular location are relatively more favourable to
firms with similar backgrounds. Thus, this demonstration effect captures the impact on a firm’s
FDI decision of the presence of an existing investment by source country s in host country h.
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A positive demonstration effect would arise if, ceteris paribus, a firm was more likely to invest
in a nation that was already host to FDI from the same source country.
We now turn to an empirical examination of North-South and South-South FDI in order
to determine whether the interaction between the source country’s public governance quality
with the host country’s public governance quality influences investment decisions. In doing so,
we will attempt to gauge the presence and importance of both experience and demonstration
effects.
3 Econometric model and data
In this section, we first describe our key variables: the dependent variable and our measures of
public governance quality. We then turn to the econometric methods, which are fundamentally
related the modeling of over-dispersed count data with a preponderance of zero values. Finally
we briefly discuss the control variables included in our regressions and provide an example of
how the graphical presentation of our key results should be interpreted.
3.1 Dependent variable
We consider FDI in developing countries where the cross-sectional data used are the total num-
bers of majority-owned foreign affiliates located in these host countries, as reported by the
UNCTAD on the Investment Map website in November 2007.7 The original source of the data
is The Global Reference Solution, from Dun & Bradstreet. In terms of data limitations, useful
information, such as the sales or the number of employees are frequently not reported and cov-
erage and accuracy can vary across countries. Despite these caveats, the picture provided by
Dun & Bradstreet seems fairly accurate on two grounds. Firstly, the Spearman correlation co-
efficient between the number of U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates reported in the database
and that reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for 2006 is 0.90. Secondly, the
Spearman correlation coefficient between the overall number of majority-owned foreign af-
filiates reported in the database and the inward FDI stock reported by UNCTAD in 2007 is
7http://www.investmentmap.org/invmap/index.aspx?prg=1. Information is provided on
foreign affiliates located in developing countries and economies in transition that do not belong to the European
Union. Hence, only determinants of North-South and South-South FDI are investigated.
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0.74. Table 1 indicates the main sources and hosts of South FDI. The top source and host
countries tend to be the largest and the richest economies. The widespread presence of tax
havens among source countries (e.g. British Virgin Islands or Panama) suggests that, despite
Dun & Bradstreet’s efforts, the data include “roundtripping” and “trans-shipping” FDI.8 The
“fundamental-based” outward FDI of some countries may be thus over- or under-stated.
[Table 1 about here.]
3.2 Measures of public governance
Data on the quality of countries’ public governance come from Kaufmann et al. (2008), who
have evaluated six dimensions of public governance for the period 1996-2007, on the basis of
polls of experts or surveys of businessmen/citizens. The categories are (i) Voice and Account-
ability (VA), (ii) Political Stability (PS), (iii) Government Effectiveness (GE), (iv) Regulatory
Quality (RQ), (v) Rule of Law (RL) and (vi) Control of Corruption (CC). VA and PS attempt
to capture the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced, GE and RQ are
related to the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies, while RL
and CC assess the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions which govern their in-
teractions. These indicators have been used widely in the FDI literature, e.g. Globerman and
Shapiro (2003) and Daude and Stein (2007), and are available for most countries in the world.
Summary statistics are given in table 2.
The value of each public governance variable, for source and host countries, is the average
of the 1996-2004 values. Two considerations motivate this decision. First, data for most other
control variables are only available until the year 2004. Second, we wish to account for the dif-
ferent institutional paths of countries. Our dependent variable is assimilable to the cumulative
outcome of past investment decisions, partly shaped, according to our analytical model, by the
interaction of domestic experience of poor institutional quality and the quality of a given host
country’s public governance at the time of the decision. Even though institutional risk in the
8Roundtripping refers to the situation where different treatments of foreign and domestic investors encourage
the latter to channel their funds into special purpose entities (SPEs) abroad in order to subsequently repatriate
them in the form of incentive-eligible FDI. With trans-shipping, funds channeled into SPEs in offshore financial
centres are redirected to other countries, leading to strong divergences between the source country of the FDI and
the ultimate beneficiary owner.
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source country may be currently low, MNEs, and their managers, may have been exposed to
higher levels of risk in the past, allowing them to gain practical knowledge on how to operate,
today, in difficult business conditions. From the host country perspective, the current quality of
a host country’s public governance may not perfectly reflect past institutional quality.9 Assum-
ing that a given host country only recently achieved good public governance, it is likely that it
will not be host, ceteris paribus, to as many foreign affiliates as a country that developed good
institutions a long time ago. Averages allow us to accommodate, admittedly imperfectly, these
institutional dynamics, which may influence, or have influenced, FDI decisions.
[Table 2 about here.]
3.3 Econometric model and control variables
3.3.1 Count data modeling
Given that our dependent variable is a count variable, which can only take nonnegative integer
values, we adopt a count data model.10 We need to tackle three issues: truncation, unobserved
heterogeneity and data-generating process (dgp) of zeros.
The database maintained by Dun & Bradstreet records the ownership information of firms.
Hence, the UNCTAD Investment Map database on foreign affiliates only include positive counts
of foreign affiliates by construction. Given that our data are truncated from below at zero, the
conditional probability mass function (pmf ) f(y|x) needs to be normalised in order that the
truncated pmf s sum to one: f(y|x, y > 0) = f(y|x)
1−f(0|x)
, with y being the number of foreign
affiliates from source country s located in host country h, and x a number of variables that are
believed to influence the location choices of MNEs.
A Poisson distribution is usually the starting point of a count data analysis. Its pmf is
f(y|µ) = exp(−µ)µ
y
y!
, with µ > 0. µ is the parameter defining both the mean and the variance of
9Values of the correlation coefficients between the 1996 and 2004 values of the six public governance dimen-
sions range between 0.70 (CC) and 0.88 (VA).
10For a comprehensive exposition of count data models, see Long (1997) Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and
Winkelmann (2008). Our discussion of count data econometrics relies on these sources.
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the Poisson distribution and can be interpreted as the expected number of times that an event
has occurred, with µ = E(y|x). Given that the expected number of counts must be positive
(µ > 0), an exponential conditional mean function is usually adopted: µ = exp(x′β), where
x′β is the linear predictor. In our empirical analysis, the linear predictor will be:
x′β = β0 + β1Source PG qualitys + β2Host PG qualityh +
β3(Source PG qualitys × Host PG qualityh) +
18∑
i=4
βiControl variables
where PG stands for Public Governance and the control variables can be related to the des-
tination country, the host country or both. A model in which experience of poor domestic
institutional quality does not matter when MNEs make their location decisions is equivalent
to constraining β3 to be equal to zero. On the other hand, if experience matters, the effect
of host country’s public governance on the location decision is no more ‘unconditional’ and
fully accounted for by β2 as the effect becomes ‘conditional’ on experience and corresponds to
β2 + β3 × Source PG qualitys. Given our previous discussion, and the assumption that better
public governance in a source country implies less experience of poor institutional quality, we
expect β3 to be positive: the smaller the exposure of MNEs to institutional risk in their source
country the larger the weight attributed to a host country’s institutional risk in their location
choices.
It is unlikely that the regressors x will fully explain the individual heterogeneity in the con-
ditional mean of y. By analogy with the linear regression model, the effects of omitted factors
independent of the observed variables can be captured via the inclusion of of a random compo-
nent ǫ in the conditional mean function: µ˜ = exp(x′β + ǫ) = exp(x′β)exp(ǫ) = exp(x′β)u.
The distribution of observations given regressors x and unknown u is still Poisson, implying
that E(y|x, u) = V ar(y|x, u). It is straightforward to see that taking into account unobserved
heterogeneity does not change the conditional mean ifE(u) = 1 as E(µ˜) = E(µu) = µE(u) =
µ = E(y|x). This assumption can be conveniently met if it is assumed that u is gamma dis-
tributed with parameter ν, which implies that E(u) = 1 and V ar(u) = 1
ν
= α. Unobserved
heterogeneity implies overdispersion (V ar(y|x) > E(y|x)) since, using the variance decom-
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position theorem, V ar(y|x) = Eu[V ar(y|x, u)] + V aru[(E(y|x, u)] = µ + α2µ > µ. The
marginal distribution of y is a Poisson-Gamma mixture, whose integration over u leads to the
negative binomial distribution for y. Alternatively, the negative binomial distribution may be
understood as the outcome of contagion (dependence) between the occurrence of successive
events, implying, for instance, that a first FDI increases the probability of another FDI. With
cross-sectional data, it is not possible to distinguish between an observed distribution of counts
that is the result of unobserved heterogeneity or contagion, although both possibilities seem
feasible in our empirical application.
The truncated conditional mean of a truncated negative binomial model, E(y|x, α, y > 0),
is the non-truncated conditional mean, E(y|x, α), adjusted by the inverse of the probability
of a positive count: E(y|x, α, y > 0) = E(y|x,α)
1−f(0|x)
, where f(0|x) is the probability of zero
counts assuming a negative binomial probability function. The non-truncated conditional mean
can be recovered from the truncated conditional mean by noting that E(y|x, α) = Pr(y >
0|x)E(y|x, α, y > 0) = (1 − f(0|x))E(y|x,α)
1−f(0|x)
. Such a decomposition, applicable to any count
data model, makes it clear that as long as zeros and positive counts are assumed to be generated
by the same dgp, the estimated parameters of the truncated negative binomial model are infor-
mative regarding the effect of a change in a given regressor on the expected number of counts
without truncation.
However, assuming that zeros and positives come from the same dgp may be too restrictive.
In that case a hurdle model, in which the hurdle is set at zero, can be used, i.e.
f(y|z, x, α) =


g1(0|z) if y = 0
1−g1(0|z)
1−f2(0|x,α)
f2(y|x, α) = Θf2(y|x, α) if y ≥ 1
where f2(.|x) is the negative binomial conditional pmf, referred as the parent process, and
g1(0|z) is the conditional probability of a zero outcome, defined by the logistic function in
our empirical application such as Pr(y = 0|z) = 1
1+exp(z′γ)
. The negative binomial hurdle
model (NBHM) reverts to a standard negative binomial regression model (NBRM) when g1(.)
and f2(.) are the same, i.e. Θ = 1. The conditional mean can now be written: E(y|x, α) =
Pr(y1 > 0|z)E(y2|x, α, y2 > 0), where the subscripts 1 and 2 are used to emphasise that a
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hurdle model combines a binary model with a zero-truncated model. These two models can be
independently estimated and the sets of regressors z and x may be overlapping.
The flexibility of the hurdle model is appealing as it may provide a more appropriate speci-
fication of the conditional mean function. For a given regressor x1 = z1, the overall mean effect
of a change in its value is, in semi-elasticity form:
∂E(y|x, α)/E(y|x, α)
∂x1
=
∂Pr(y1 > 0|z)/Pr(y1 > 0|z)
∂x1
+
∂E(y2|x, α, y2 > 0)/E(y2|x, α, y2 > 0)
∂x1
It can be readily seen that the overall mean effect of a change in a given regressor can be
decomposed into an effect at the extensive margin, i.e. its impact on the probability that a
positive count occurs, and an effect at the intensive margin, i.e. its impact on the expected
number of counts given that at least one event, in our case FDI, occurs. Given that both effects
are no more constrained to be function of the same parameter β, since they are determined
by two different models (logit and zero-truncated negative binomial model), a regressor may
have an effect at the extensive margin, by influencing the probability of crossing the hurdle,
but little effect at the intensive margin, by not affecting the truncated conditional expectation.
For instance, from an economic perspective, the hurdle model can be interpreted as reflecting
a two-stage decision-making process by MNEs, each (functionally independent) part being a
model of one decision. The first part of the hurdle model determines the probability that MNEs
from source country s will decide whether or not to invest at all in host country h. The hurdle is
crossed if at least one FDI takes place within a country-pair, and the second part of the hurdle
model determines the number of affiliates that MNEs from s choose to establish subsequently
in host country h. It could be imagined that experience of poor domestic institutional quality
lowers the hurdle for investing in a risky developing country for some MNEs but, once an initial
investment has been made, the knowledge derived from actually operating a foreign affiliate in
the risky country, or observing a compatriot doing that very activity, renders past experience
much less relevant when taking the decision of establishing additional foreign affiliates. Given
that ‘demonstration’ effect, experience of institutional risk would only have an effect at the
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extensive margin.
3.3.2 Specification tests and econometric model adopted
The Poisson distribution is a special case of the negative binomial distribution when α = 0. It
is for instance easily seen that if α = 0, V ar(y|x) = µ + 02 = µ, leading to the rejection of
overdispersion, and by extension, unobserved heterogeneity. Since the zero-truncated Poisson
model (ZTPM) is nested in the zero-truncated negative binomial model (ZTNBM), through the
parametric restriction that α = 0, Wald or Likelihood ratio tests, modified to take into account
that α ≥ 0, can be be used to test the null hypothesis that α = 0. In our empirical application,
both tests always reject the absence of overdispersion.
[Table 3 about here.]
Even though our data are truncated at zero we can populate our dataset with zero values,
which correspond to country-pairs for which no FDI has been observed, as we are not restricted
by a lack of information on explanatory variables when y = 0. In that case, even though the
estimators of the ZTNBM are consistent, is is more efficient to use a standard NBRM, which
uses more information about y. Hence the choice of our final model boils down to making a
selection between the single-index NBRM in which zeros and positives are assumed to have the
same dgp or the multi-index NBHM in which the opposite is assumed. A modified likelihood
ratio (LR) test, the Vuong model selection test (Vuong, 1989), needs to be used to determine
which model is closer to the true model, because the NBRM and the NBHM are not nested.
This test is fundamentally based on testing the null hypothesis that the log-likelihood of both
models, evaluated at their respective maximum likelihood estimates, has the same expected
value, i.e. both models are equivalent. Large positive values of the Vuong statistic (V > 1.96)
favor the null (first) model, whereas large negative values (V < −1.96) favour the alternative
(second) model. We compute the Vuong statistic for NBHM vs. NBRM and, as a robustness
check, for NBHM vs. PHM (Poisson Hurdle model). We also test the NBHM against another
popular model that captures flexibly the generation of zero counts, the ZINB (Zero-Inflated
Negative Binomial) model. The main difference between the NBHM and the ZINB is that the
latter allows zeros to be generated by both binary and count processes. Conceptually, we did
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not adopt the ZINB model as it seems unlikely that our zero values correspond to a situation
in which investment could have taken place but did not actually occur, given the fact that our
dependent variable represents the cumulative outcome of all past investment decisions until the
end of 2007. Table 3 shows that, in our empirical application, the LR test of Vuong always
favours the NBHM.
3.3.3 Control variables
We assume that the variables (z) which influence the probability that MNEs from a given source
country s will invest in a given host country h are the same as those (x) that determine the ex-
pected number of foreign affiliates, conditional on the fact that MNEs from s have at least
invested once in h. In addition to the public governance variables for the source and host
countries and their interaction, the vector of explanatory variables includes fourteen control
variables, listed in table 4, most of them are commonly found in the FDI literature of gravity-
type models.11 A tax haven source country dummy is also included in order to control for
the over-reporting of FDI originating from offshore financial centres/tax havens. Finally, to
reduce the risk that the interaction of the public governance variable picks up any unobserved
effect related to the proximity of economic development of a country-pair, e.g. similarity of
customers’ tastes, we introduce the similarity index proposed by Buch et al. (2005). It is cal-
culated as Ssh = 1− abs(GDPPCh−GDPPCs)max(GDPPCh,GDPPCs) and ranges between 0 (very dissimilar) and 1 (very
similar). Values of control variables have been averaged over the 2000-2004 period, to reduce
the influence of short-run fluctuations or measurement errors.
[Table 4 about here.]
3.3.4 Graphical interpretation of results
In our analytical model, we argue that an MNE’s experience of poor institutions at home may
influence its willingness to invest in risky locations. In particular, we would expect investors
who have experienced poor domestic institutional quality to be less deterred by country risk
11As noted by Blonigen et al. (2007) “the gravity model is arguably the most widely used empirical specification
for FDI” (p. 1309). Bergstrand and Egger (2007) and Head and Ries (2008) have recently provided theoretical
rationales for estimating FDI gravity equations.
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abroad. Hence, the effects of an improvement in the quality of a host country’s public gover-
nance, may not be unconditional, in the sense that they depend on the origin of the FDI.
We adopt a graphical approach to present our results, in order to provide a meaningful inter-
pretation of the unconditional and conditional impacts of public governance at different stages
of the decision-making process of MNEs. Figure 3 shows how we summarise the unconditional
and conditional effects of each public governance variable, taking as an example the overall ef-
fect of an improvement in Government Effectiveness (GE) on the expected number of foreign
affiliates.
The top graph provides the estimated unconditional factor increase in the expected number
of foreign affiliates given a unit discrete change in GE,12 depicted by a medium-width solid line,
and its 95% confidence interval, depicted by dashed lines. Source institutional quality is on
the horizontal axis, with a greater value implying less experience of poor institutional quality.
All lines are horizontal since the effect of an improvement in the quality of a host country’s
public governance on MNEs’location choices is assumed not to depend on their experience of
poor domestic institutional quality. A horizontal dotted line is also drawn, which intersects the
vertical axis at a factor increase of one. Statistical significance is achieved when all lines are
above the dotted line, i.e. when the confidence interval does not include an estimated factor
increase of one, corresponding to an impact of public governance on FDI not significantly
different from zero.
The middle graph provides the estimated conditional effect of a unit increase in GE, de-
picted by a thick-width solid curve, and its confidence interval, depicted by dashed curves. In
order to obtain this conditional effect, the host country’s GE measure is interacted with the
source country’s GE measure. The curves, for this specific public governance dimension, are
upward-sloping, in line with our hypothesis that the effects of public governance depend on
MNEs’ experience of poor domestic institutional quality. Two vertical lines are also drawn.
The first of these indicates the value of the measure of institutional quality for a median “FDI-
active” source South country while the second indicates the value of the measure of institutional
12More specifically, we examine the impact of a one unit change in GE, centered around its median value in the
truncated sample (see table 2).
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quality for a median “FDI-active” source North country.13
The bottom graph, that we will report in the next section, simply combines the two preced-
ing graphs and allows a direct comparison between the unconditional and conditional effects of
public governance.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Given the relative complexity of our econometric model, and our emphasis on discrete
changes, all estimated effects, and their confidence intervals, are calculated following the
simulation-based approach of King et al. (2000).14 In a first stage, 10000 simulations of the
main and auxiliary parameters are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with means
equal to the vector of parameter estimates and variances equal to the variance-covariance ma-
trix of parameter estimates. For each draw, the effect of a change in the value of the public
governance variable on the value of the predicted probability/count is then calculated and ex-
pressed as a factor change, holding other variables at their truncated sample medians. The
reported impact in each figure is the average of the 10000 simulated effects while their 2.5 and
97.5 percentile values, respectively, provide the lower and upper bounds of a 95% confidence
interval.
4 Results
We relegate our (initial) regression coefficient estimates to the Appendix since we only focus
on the effects of public governance and have adopted a graphical approach. We simply note
that it can be seen in table 6 that all control variables have the expected sign and are generally
significant across regressions. In addition, table 7 shows that better governance in the source
country tends to promote FDI, even though the impact depends on the dimension and margin
considered. This positive effect of better institutional quality on outward FDI corroborates the
results of Globerman and Shapiro (2002).
13By “FDI-active”, we mean that firms from this source country have at least invested once abroad. Note that
these lines do not indicate estimates but are simply summary statistics for the sample data.
14This procedure is essentially an application of the parametric bootstrap.
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4.1 Discussion
We start the discussion of our results by looking at the overall effects of better public gover-
nance on the expected number of foreign affiliates (figure 4 and table 5). Without taking into
account the mitigating influence of experience of institutional risk, we find that only the RL
dimension does not exert a statistically significant impact on the expected number of foreign
affiliates located in a given host country. Among the other governance variables, improvements
in RQ, following by improvements in VA, would have the biggest impacts on FDI attractive-
ness. For instance, if Ghana’s average VA had been rated as high as that of South Africa or
if India’s average RQ had been rated as high as that of South Korea (about the equivalent of a
one point increase), the number of foreign affiliates located in these countries would have been
expected to increase by a factor of 2.7 and 2.9 respectively. These results are in line with the
findings of previous empirical literature.
The picture becomes much more nuanced when we take into account that not all investors
are equal in the face of institutional risk. We find that the statistical and substantive significance
of an improvement in the quality of a host country’s public governance crucially depends, in
most cases, on whether MNEs have had experience of poor institutional quality at home. The
intersection of the solid curves with the two vertical lines provides useful points of reference.
For MNEs located in a median FDI-active developed country, improvements in every public
governance condition besides RL would still, in statistical and substantive terms, significantly
raise the expected number of foreign affiliates in a given country. The conditional effects are
10-20% larger than the unconditional effects. On the other hand, for MNEs located in a median
FDI-active developing country, several public governance dimensions are no more statistically
significant, e.g. GE, while the economic impacts of the others are significantly reduced. For
instance, a one point increase in RQ would increase the expected number of foreign affiliates
belonging to MNEs located in a median FDI-active developing country by a statistically signif-
icant factor of only 2.4, four-fifths of the unconditional effect. These findings strongly support
our hypothesis that the sensitivity of firms to foreign risk is heterogenous, as it depends on their
experience of risk in their source country. However a noticeable exception is when we look
at the effects of PS. The conditional effect is almost undistinguishable from the unconditional
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effect.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
The unconditional and conditional overall mean effects of better public governance on the
expected number of foreign affiliates does not provide a full account of how an improvement
in host country’s public governance influences MNEs’ decision-making process, as it is a com-
bination of effects at the extensive and intensive margins. It is, for instance, conceivable that
the overall positive effect previously put forward is mostly due to a rise in the probability that
MNES invests in a given host country, without any change in the expected number of foreign
affiliates once a FDI has initially taken place. Such a situation could arise if the initial invest-
ment by a MNE from a given source country generates ‘demonstration effects’ for itself and
other MNEs, compensating for any lack of prior experience of poor institutional quality in their
source country. Hence, we now turn to the examination of the impacts of the various public
governance dimensions at the extensive and intensive margins.
At the extensive margin, only improvements in VA, GE and RQ would result in a statisti-
cally significant positive unconditional impact on the probability that a given host country is
chosen as a FDI location. Once again, a one unit increase in RQ would generate the largest
factor increase. The conditional effects again support our hypothesis since, for every public
governance dimension, including PS, the impact of better public governance increases as expe-
rience of poor institutional quality at home decreases. From a statistical significance perspec-
tive, only improvements in VA and RQ would matter for MNEs located in a median FDI-active
developing country.
At the intensive margin, improvements in VA, PS, GE, RQ and CC would result in a sta-
tistically significant positive unconditional impact on the expected number of foreign affiliates
once MNEs from a given source country have at least invested once in a given host country.
Conditionally, only improvements in VA and PS would statistically matter for MNEs located in
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a median FDI-active developing country. The curves depicting the conditional effects weakly
suggest that ‘demonstration effects’ may indeed exist as they tend to be flatter than those at the
extensive margin. For instance, the average ratio between the estimated conditional effects for
a median FDI-active developed country and for its developing counterpart is about 1.17 at the
extensive margin, but 1.07 at the intensive margin. Finally, we find the reason for the absence
of support to our hypothesis when we look at the overall effect of better PS: the conditional
effect at the intensive margin is negatively related to experience of poor institutional quality.
Overall, these empirical findings confirm our broad hypothesis that South MNEs are less
deterred by risk than North MNEs, thanks to greater experience of poor institutional quality at
home. They also point out that the latter may be particularly crucial when a South country is
terra incognita for MNEs located in a given source country, whereas it may matter less once a
first foreign affiliate has been established.
In the next section, we submit our results to a battery of robustness checks.
4.2 Robustness checks
We consider, in turn, the issues of aggregation, data reliability and governance proxies.
In our database, the number of foreign affiliates are available at the sector level. However,
we decided to use only the aggregate number of foreign affiliates, given that the rest of our data
are only available at the country-level. We thus implicitly assumed that, whichever the sector,
FDI is driven by the same determinants. It could then be argued that our results are an arti-
fact of an aggregation bias, based on the presupposition that MNEs from developing countries
tend to primarily invest in the primary sector whereas MNEs from developed countries mainly
invest in the secondary and tertiary sectors.15 MNEs motivated by the extraction of natural
resources have very little choice with regard to the location of their foreign affiliates, given the
uneven world distribution of subsoil assets.16 Greater location choice allows MNEs operating
15The primary sector includes such activities as mining and extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas.
The secondary sector includes such activities as manufacture of chemical products and manufacture of electric
and electronic equipment. The tertiary sector includes such activities as wholesale and retail trade and financial
intermediation.
16MNEs they may still be deterred by the combination of very large sunk costs and the frequent occurrences of
“obsolescing bargains” (Vernon, 1971) between the MNE and the host country, resulting in creeping expropriation.
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in other sectors to choose relatively safe countries. In that case, our negative relationship be-
tween experience of poor institutional quality and the effect of an improvement of a given host
country’s public governance may only reflect the heterogenous sectoral motives of developed
and developing countries MNEs. This line of reasoning is nevertheless not supported by em-
pirical evidence. In our sample, foreign affiliates belonging to developed countries MNES are
relatively more numerous than their developing counterparts (10% vs. 7%) in the primary sec-
tor. In addition, it can be seen in table 5 that excluding foreign affiliates located in the primary
sector from our sample leaves our initial conclusions unchanged.
It is also likely that the number of foreign affiliates is underreported in some countries.
In order to check whether our results are not affected by this measurement error in the de-
pendent variable, we assume that the activities of a country’s MNEs are better recorded when
Dun&Bradstreet, or one of its worldwide network members, explicitly covers a given coun-
try.17 Table 5 shows that removing uncovered countries from our sample does not substantively
change our main results.
Finally, throughout the paper, we have used the World Bank governance variables; unfortu-
nately they are only available for a recent time period. An alternative measure of institutional
quality, widely used in the FDI literature, is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
Political Risk rating, which aggregates numerical evaluations of twelve dimensions of political
risk.18 The indicator ranges from 0 (high political risk) to 100 (no political risk). Its spatial cov-
erage is less than that of our public governance proxies but it is available over the 1984-2008
period. Hence, using its 1984-2004 average may allow us to better capture the institutional tra-
jectories of source and host countries, and their interactions.19 Table 5 indicates that this new
public governance proxy makes little difference to our initial results.
[Table 5 about here.]
17The list of the countries covered are available at http://dnb.com.au/Header/About_Us/
Company_profile/DandB_Worldwide_Network/DandB_Worldwide_Network_members/
index.aspx. MNEs from these countries are responsible for about 40% and 80% of total and strictly positive
observations respectively.
18These dimensions are (1) government stability, (2) socioeconomic conditions, (3) investment profile, (4) inter-
nal conflict, (5) external conflict, (6) corruption, (7) military in politics, (8) religion in politics, (9) law and order,
(10) ethnic tensions, (11) democratic accountability, (12) bureaucracy quality. See http://www.prsgroup.
com/
19Our results are robust to the use of other period averages.
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5 Conclusion
This paper addresses a gap in the existing literature by investigating, theoretically and empir-
ically, whether the higher prevalence of South MNEs in risky developing countries may be
explained by the experience that they have acquired of poor institutional quality at home. We
confirm the intuition provided by our analytical model by showing empirically that the positive
impact of good public governance on FDI in a given host country is moderated significantly,
and for some dimensions eliminated, when MNEs have had experience of poor institutional
quality at home. In contrast, MNEs with little experience are deterred much more by bad pub-
lic governance conditions than could have been inferred from an unconditional estimation of
the effects of public governance on FDI.
The growth of South FDI and its relative insensitivity to risk may be good news for those
countries with underdeveloped institutions, as these nations are often amongst the poorest and
the most in need of additional capital. Furthermore, it is possible that South-South FDI may be
of more benefit to developing countries than North-South FDI in terms of technology transfer,
given lower technology gaps. However, the fact that South MNEs are less worried by the
quality of the host country’s business environment or the respect of political and civil rights
than their Northern counterparts may impede the positive influence of globalisation towards
better governance, which, overall, remains a strong determinant of FDI.
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Table 1: Sources and destinations of South FDI
Number of foreign affiliates
Main source countries Main host countries, by source
South North South North
Mauritius 23 Norway 282 Chile 27 Viet Nam 260
Poland 26 Belgium 311 Barbados∗th 30 Croatia 300
Venezuela 27 Cayman Islands∗th 311 Nicaragua 35 Ecuador 314
Costa Rica 35 Portugal 406 Thailand 36 Uruguay 315
Guatemala 37 Australia 412 El Salvador 37 Egypt 410
Turkey 39 Finland 531 Philippines 38 Peru 420
China 39 Luxembourgth 531 Guatemala 41 Ukraine 449
Saudi Arabia 42 Austria 532 India 45 Panamath 459
Indonesia 43 British Virgin Islands∗th 706 Bolivia 49 Morocco 460
Thailand 46 Denmark 746 Ecuador 50 South Africa 640
Russian Federation 52 Bermuda∗th 792 Costa Rica 50 Philippines 654
Trinidad and Tobago 54 Taiwan Province of China 851 Malaysia 53 Colombia 838
Czech Republic 73 Canada 860 Turkey 62 Venezuela 863
Colombia 84 Sweden 1303 Ukraine 73 Indonesia 914
South Africa 89 Italy 1522 Uruguay 76 Chile 993
Barbados∗th 114 Singaporeth 1556 Panamath 80 Thailand 1068
India 154 Spain 2416 Colombia 87 Turkey 1355
Uruguay 162 Switzerlandth 2762 Peru 88 Republic of Korea 1793
Malaysia 207 Netherlands 3839 Venezuela 100 Russian Federation 2000
Argentina 212 United Kingdom 4616 Indonesia 115 Malaysia 2362
Chile 265 Hong Kong, Chinath 4652 Russian Federation 115 India 2372
Panamath 292 France 6077 Mexico 144 Argentina 3215
Brazil 305 Germany 7535 Argentina 456 Mexico 10018
Mexico 317 Japan 10586 Brazil 667 Brazil 18023
Republic of Korea 787 United States 20267 China 710 China 19128
Total 3887 75487
Notes: South: developing country according to World Bank classification (low and middle income countries). North: developed
country according to World Bank classification (high income countries).∗ : country not included in the estimation sample due to data
limitations.th : tax haven countries. Data sources: UNCTAD and Dun & Bradstreet.
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Table 2: Public governance: summary statistics
Variable Mean Median∗ Std. dev. Min Max
Host
Voice and Accountability (VA) -0.41 -0.32 0.80 -2.10 1.30
Political Stability (PS) -0.36 -0.30 0.85 -2.41 1.35
Government Effectiveness (GE) -0.44 -0.29 0.61 -1.96 1.31
Regulatory Quality (RQ) -0.42 -0.17 0.73 -2.41 1.39
Rule of Law (RL) -0.48 -0.40 -0.54 -2.13 1.22
Control of Corruption (CC) -0.45 -0.39 0.62 -1.70 1.36
Source
Voice and Accountability (VA) -0.06 1.24 0.97 -2.10 1.63
Political Stability (PS) -0.04 0.81 0.94 -2.41 1.49
Government Effectiveness (GE) 0.00 1.62 0.98 -1.96 2.26
Regulatory Quality (RQ) -0.02 1.29 0.96 -2.41 1.87
Rule of Law (RL) -0.05 1.39 0.97 -2.13 1.96
Control of Corruption (CC) -0.01 1.41 0.98 -1.70 2.35
Note: Std. Dev.: Standard deviation. Values averaged over the 1996-2004 period.
Median∗ : Median values correspond to the truncated sample medians. Data source: Kauf-
mann et al. (2008).
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Table 3: Choosing between models
Governance indicator VA PS GE RQ RL CC
NBHM vs. NBRM 10.85 11.18 6.68 6.38 5.48 7.07
NBHM vs. HPM 13.80 13.37 14.31 14.39 13.32 14.47
NBHM vs. ZINB 4.39 2.30 2.48 3.36 2.52 2.28
Notes: A positive value of the Vuong statistic greater than two indicates that the first model should be
preferred to the second model. VA: Voice and Accountability. PS: Political Stability. GE: Government
Effectiveness. RQ: Regulatory Quality. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Control of Corruption. All models include
the full set of control variables.
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Table 4: Dependent and control variables
Variable Expected sign Definition Source Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Foreign affiliates Dependent Number of foreign affiliates established in host country h by MNEs located in source
country s
Dun &
Bradstreet/UNCTAD 3.17 77 0.00 5825
Host GDP + Ln gross domestic product (GDP) of the host country, in 2000 constant PPP $US 16.81 2.07 11.83 22.50
Source GDP + Ln gross domestic product (GDP) of the source country, in 2000 constant PPP $US 17.24 2.16 11.83 23.03
Heston et al. (2002)
Host GDPPC + Ln gross domestic product per capita of the host country, in 2000 constant PPP $US 8.11 0.95 6.11 10.27
Source GDPPC + Ln gross domestic product per capita of the source country, in 2000 constant PPP $US 8.58 1.18 6.11 10.80
Similarity index + Ssh = 1− abs(GDPPCh−GDPPCs)max(GDPPCh,,GDPPCs) 0.38 0.27 0.01 1.00
Distance - Ln population-weighted bilateral distance between the source country and the host
country, kms 8.78 0.73 4.55 9.89
Contiguity + Dummy set equal to 1 if the host country and the source country shares a commonborder 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
Common language + Dummy set equal to 1 if the host country and the source country shares a commonlanguage
CEPII Mayer and Zignago
(2006) 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
Colony + Dummy set equal to 1 if the host country and the source country have ever had a coloniallink 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Landlock - Dummy set equal to 1 if the host country is landlocked 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
RTA + Dummy set equal to 1 if the host country and source country are involved in a regionaltrade agreement (RTA) 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
GSP + Dummy set equal to 1 if the host country and source country are involved in ageneralised system of preferences program (GSP) Rose (2004) 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
CU + Dummy set equal to 1 if the host country and source country are involved in a strict
currency union (CU) 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00
Tax haven + Dummy set equal to 1 if the source country is identified by the U.S. Department ofTreasury as a tax haven Hines and Rice (1994) 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Notes: Income data have been averaged over the 2000-2004 period.
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Table 5: Robustness checks
VA PS GE RQ
Changes in sample
U C-Dvping C-Dvped U C-Dvping C-Dvped U C-Dvping C-Dvped U C-Dvping C-Dvped
Extensive margin 1.65* 1.62* 1.78* 1.20 1.18 1.22 1.47* 1.24 1.64* 1.80* 1.67* 1.93*
No change Intensive margin 1.60* 1.48* 1.62* 1.38* 1.45* 1.35* 1.46* 1.22 1.50* 1.57* 1.42 1.57*
Overall 2.67* 2.42* 2.90* 1.66* 1.72* 1.66* 2.17* 1.53 2.47* 2.85* 2.39* 3.06*
Overall dvping
Overall dvped 0.83 1.04 0.62 0.78
Without Extensive margin 1.66* 1.64* 1.79* 1.21 1.19 1.22 1.48* 1.24 1.65* 1.81* 1.71* 1.93*
primary Intensive margin 1.60* 1.49* 1.61* 1.39* 1.45* 1.37* 1.46* 1.24 1.50* 1.57* 1.43* 1.58*
sector Overall 2.66* 2.47* 2.90* 1.69* 1.74* 1.69* 2.19* 1.56 2.49* 2.87* 2.48* 3.08*
Overall dvping
Overall dvped 0.85 1.03 0.63 0.81
Only Extensive margin 1.37* 1.48* 1.43* 1.08 1.04 1.11 1.27* 1.33 1.33* 1.39* 1.61* 1.46*
from source countries Intensive margin 1.43* 1.15 1.51* 1.36* 1.39* 1.33 1.33 0.99 1.41* 1.45* 1.33 1.45*
where D&B is present Overall 1.97* 1.71* 2.16* 1.48* 1.44* 1.70* 2.68* 1.33 1.90* 2.03* 2.16* 2.13*
Overall dvping
Overall dvped 0.79 0.85 0.70 1.01
RL CC ICRG-PR
Changes in sample
U C-Dvping C-Dvped U C-Dvping C-Dvped U C-Dvping C-Dvped
Extensive margin 1.17 1.02 1.25 1.17 1.04 1.22
No change Intensive margin 1.12 1.10 1.12 1.44* 1.38 1.43*
Overall 1.31 1.13 1.47 1.69* 1.44 1.76*
Overall dvping
Overall dvped 0.77 0.82
Without Extensive margin 1.17 1.03 1.26 1.17 1.05 1.22
primary Intensive margin 1.12 1.10 1.12 1.45* 1.40 1.45*
sector Overall 1.32 1.14 1.41 1.71* 1.47 1.78*
Overall dvping
Overall dvped 0.81 0.83
Only Extensive margin 1.13* 1.11 1.17* 1.12 1.13 1.15*
from source countries Intensive margin 0.98 0.87 1.24 1.24 1.07 1.29
where D&B is present Overall 1.11 0.97 1.20 1.40 1.22 1.49*
Overall dvping
Overall dvped 0.81 0.82
Use of Extensive margin 1.25* 1.20 1.32*
ICRG Political risk Intensive margin 1.35* 1.12 1.44*
variable (1984-2004) Overall 1.70* 1.35 1.92*
Overall dvping
Overall dvped 0.70
Notes: * denotes statistical significance (at least) at the 5% level. Numbers correspond to the estimated factor increase following a one unit increase (ten points increase in the
ICRG PR case) in a given public governance variable. U: Estimated unconditional effect. C-Dvping: Conditional effect, at the median FDI-active developing country value.
C-Dvped: Conditional effect, at the median FDI-active developed country value. VA: Voice and Accountability. PS: Political Stability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ:
Regulatory Quality. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Control of Corruption.
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Table 6: Determinants of South-South FDI: control variables
VA PS GE RQ RL CC
Determinant/Margin Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
(1) (1)’ (2) (2)’ (3) (3)’ (4) (4)’ (5) (5)’ (6) (6)’
Source ln(GDP) 0.75∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Host ln(GDP) 0.64∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08)
Source ln(GDPPC) 0.80∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.20) (0.09) (0.20) (0.08) (0.24) (0.08) (0.28) (0.08) (0.20) (0.08) (0.22)
Host ln(GDPPC) 0.07 -0.19 0.21∗ -0.08 0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.12 0.17 0.06 0.18 -0.07
(0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.22) (0.13) (0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.13) (0.20) (0.13) (0.23)
Similarity index -0.06 0.89 0.02 0.70 0.36∗∗ 0.68 0.04 0.56 0.42∗∗ 0.81 0.41∗∗ 0.65
(0.20) (0.61) (0.19) (0.55) (0.18) (0.54) (0.20) (0.61) (0.18) (0.54) (0.18) (0.53)
Ln(distance) -1.10∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.94∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.98∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
Contiguity 0.57∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.29) (0.21) (0.29) (0.19) (0.30) (0.19) (0.30) (0.20) (0.30) (0.19) (0.30)
Common language 1.05∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.20) (0.12) (0.19) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.20) (0.13) (0.18)
Former colony 1.00∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.28) (0.23) (0.28)
Landlocked -0.52∗∗ -0.29 -0.66∗∗∗ -0.34 -0.65∗∗∗ -0.32 -0.56∗∗ -0.31 -0.67∗∗∗ -0.32 -0.67∗∗∗ -0.24
(0.24) (0.26) (0.23) (0.29) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27)
RTA 1.29∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.22) (0.29) (0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29) (0.26) (0.29) (0.27)
GSP 0.89∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.18) (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.18)
CU 0.69 2.51∗∗∗ 0.55 2.15∗∗∗ 0.60 2.21∗∗∗ 0.70 2.13∗∗∗ 0.54 2.22∗∗∗ 0.51 1.95∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.70) (0.64) (0.59) (0.61) (0.61) (0.57) (0.62) (0.64) (0.64) (0.62) (0.56)
Source tax haven 1.46∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.18)
Constant -26.67∗∗∗ -27.46∗∗∗ -28.52∗∗∗ -29.89∗∗∗ -20.44∗∗∗ -28.53∗∗∗ -22.38∗∗∗ -26.90∗∗∗ -22.82∗∗∗ -30.33∗∗∗ -23.16∗∗∗ -29.10∗∗∗
(1.58) (1.91) (1.73) (1.98) (1.87) (2.56) (1.75) (2.27) (1.86) (2.37) (1.79) (2.11)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗denotes respectively significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the host country
level. VA: Voice and Accountability. PS: Political Stability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulatory Quality. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Control of Corruption. RTA: Regional Trade Agreement.
GSP: Generalised System of Preferences program. CU: strict Currency Union.
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Table 7: Determinants of South-South FDI: public governance
VA PS GE RQ RL CC
Determinant/Margin Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive Extensive Intensive
(1) (1)’ (2) (2)’ (3) (3)’ (4) (4)’ (5) (5)’ (6) (6)’
Source VA 0.73∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.22)
Host VA 0.74∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.11)
Source PS 0.24∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.16)
Host PS 0.32∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.08) (0.12)
Source GE 0.53∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗
(0.18) (0.21)
Host GE 0.97∗∗∗ 0.08
(0.07) (0.13)
Source RQ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.22)
Host RQ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗
(0.09) (0.19)
Source RL 0.20 0.14
(0.16) (0.20)
Host RL 0.96∗∗∗ 0.11
(0.08) (0.13)
Source CC 0.20 0.50∗∗
(0.17) (0.24)
Host CC 0.83∗∗∗ 0.08
(0.06) (0.11)
Observations 24569 24569 24569 24569 24569 24569 24569 24569 24569 24569 24569 24569
Log pseudolikelihood -8857 -9070 -8978 -8916 -9022 -9004
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗denotes respectively significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the host country
level. VA: Voice and Accountability. PS: Political Stability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulatory Quality. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Control of Corruption.
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Figure 1: Experience of risk and expected benefit from a risky investment
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Figure 2: Relative host-country risk and FDI-location choice
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Figure 3: Graphical interpretation of results
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iii_GE: Unconditional effect
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iii_GE: Conditional effect
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iii_GE: Both effects
Notes: A higher value of source country’s institutional quality is interpreted as lower experience of dealing with
poor public governance. Dashed lines correspond to the upper and lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval.
The value of the measure of past institutional quality for a median FDI-active source South country is indicated
by the first vertical line, while the second indicates the value of the measure of past institutional quality for a
median FDI-active source North country. The FDI active designation means that firms in a given source country
have invested at least once abroad. VA: Voice and Accountability. PS: Political Stability. GE: Government
Effectiveness. RQ: Regulatory Quality. RL: Rule of Law. CC: Control of Corruption.
36
Figure 4: The moderating influence of experience of poor institutional quality: overall effect
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Notes: See notes of figure 3.
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Figure 5: The moderating influence of experience of poor institutional quality: extensive mar-
gin
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Notes: See notes of figure 3.
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Figure 6: The moderating influence of experience of poor institutional quality: intensive margin
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Notes: See notes of figure 3.
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